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SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE KHRUSHCHEV VISIT

I. The huge volume of preparatory Soviet propaganda is expected to give way to an even greater propaganda effort now that the visit is under way.

A. In the five weeks since the 3 August announcement of the exchange, Radio Moscow has broadcast over 1,617 full commentaries.

B. In addition, there have been hundreds of radio newscasts and daily press items devoted to the exchange of visits.

II. President Eisenhower's role in initiating the exchange has been minimized.

A. Instead the propaganda hails the "victory" of the USSR's policy of peace and coexistence.

B. The President has, however, been treated in a cordial manner in the propaganda and a good many of his statements regarding the visits have been reported factually.

III. The image of Khrushchev as a statesman and peace champion has been further inflated.

A. Propagandists have paid effusive tributes to his personal leadership of the effort to relax tensions.

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Soviet propagandists have put unusual stress on the "pre-
ventability of war" and the need for a policy of "peaceful
coexistence," with wide publicity for Khrushchev's many re-
cent statements on these concepts.

A. Khrushchev repeated the contention--prominent in Soviet
propaganda since the successful Soviet ICBM test and
sputnik launchings--that the bloc's growing strength is an
increasingly effective deterrent to Western "aggression."

V. Progress toward ending the "cold war" and promoting mutual
understanding is put forth as the main aim of the visits.

A. There has been very little said about specific issues the
two leaders may discuss, but it has been implied that Ger-
many and disarmament will be taken up.

B. Initial propaganda claimed an agreement to hold a summit
conference would come out of the talks and Khrushchev on
5 August said the exchange cannot serve as a substitute
for a summit meeting. Later propaganda has ignored the
subject of a summit conference.

VI. Moscow's optimistic tone has been qualified by warnings that
"certain circles"--never the US Government itself--oppose a
detente.

A. For the most part Moscow has neglected to specify how
these "cold war circles" in the United States are making
their positions felt.

B. In the past week Soviet commentators charged such "circles"
with trying to keep tensions alive on the eve of the Khru-
shchev visit by exploiting the Laotian and Sino-Indian
situations.

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